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The Marrakesh Treaty as “Bottom Up” 
Lawmaking: Supporting Local Human 
Rights Action on IP Policies 
Molly K. Land* 
Global intellectual property rules have had adverse consequences for the 
promotion and protection of a range of human rights, including the rights to food, 
health, water, culture, equality and non-discrimination, and freedom of expression. 
Nonetheless, these issues have been framed in human rights terms primarily at the 
international and regional levels. Domestic human rights advocates have largely 
not taken up the issue of how intellectual property law affects the enjoyment of 
human rights. 
This Article argues that this incomplete translation is due to widespread 
reliance on a fairly narrow understanding of human rights. Human rights, when 
understood only as a set of legal rules and institutions, inevitably devolves into a 
debate about reconciling conflicting rights. This is an important conversation, but 
it is also a limiting one. The emancipatory potential of human rights often lies not 
in its power as a set of legal rules but in the way in which those rules can be 
employed by affected individuals to make claims and demand political change. 
Using the case study of law and politics around intellectual property mobilization, 
the Article argues that framing intellectual property in more robust human rights 
terms is important for challenging the fundamental power structures that undergird 
the intellectual property regime.  
The Article then argues that the Marrakesh Treaty—a new treaty that 
requires states to create mandatory exceptions to copyright to protect the rights of 
individuals with disabilities—charts a new path for human rights advocacy on 
intellectual property. This treaty has the potential to lay a foundation for better 
translation of intellectual property issues into human rights advocacy by identifying 
a clear violation and by activating domestic human rights advocates. Creating a 
foundation for affected individuals and human rights advocates to participate in 
 
* Molly K. Land is Professor of Law and Human Rights at the University of Connecticut School of 
Law and Associate Director of the Human Rights Institute. The author is grateful to Larry Helfer, Peter 
Siegelman, the participants in the Intellectual Property and Human Rights Conference at UC Irvine 
School of Law, and the participants in the International IP Roundtable at NYU School of Law, for their 
helpful feedback and comments. Tatyana Marugg and Alexandria Madjeric provided excellent research 
assistance. 
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intellectual property lawmaking is essential to realizing the potential of human 
rights for revising the essential bargains of the international intellectual property 
system. 
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The relationship between intellectual property and human rights is contested 
and complex, both deeply frustrating in its internal contradictions and also 
fascinating for its potential to affect lives. It is also largely irrelevant for most of the 
human rights world. Global intellectual property rules have had adverse 
consequences for the promotion and protection of a range of human rights, 
including the rights to food, health, water, culture, equality and non-discrimination, 
and freedom of expression. The relationship between human rights and intellectual 
property has also been thoroughly explored by scholars and has been the subject of 
many United Nations initiatives. Nonetheless, these efforts have largely not 
translated into domestic advocacy. Other than in a few specific areas such as access 
to essential medicines, intellectual property issues have not been taken up by local 
or international human rights advocates as explicit concerns. 
This Article explores the causes and consequences of this incomplete 
translation of intellectual property issues into human rights advocacy. The causes 
vary but are related largely to the way in which both intellectual property rights-
holders and transnational advocates working on issues of intellectual property and 
social justice have relied on the language and metrics of intellectual property to 
define and measure progress. The concerns of transnational intellectual property 
activists, which are often framed in the language of incentives, innovation, and 
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cost/benefit analysis, have not been accessible by or viewed as highly relevant to 
the work of most human rights practitioners.  
The consequence of this incomplete translation has been to deprive the human 
rights frame of its emancipatory potential to challenge the fundamental power 
structures that undergird the intellectual property regime. For human rights to be 
effective in challenging established power relationships, it must engage both law and 
politics—it must be understood not only as a set of legal rules but also as a body of 
“bottom up” discursive practices of rights claiming. 
Relying on the model embodied in a new treaty on copyright exceptions for 
individuals with disabilities, the Article charts a new path for human rights advocacy 
on intellectual property. This new treaty, the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access 
to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise 
Print Disabled (“Marrakesh Treaty” or “Treaty”) requires state parties to create 
exceptions and limitations to copyright for individuals with print disabilities. The 
Marrakesh Treaty, which came into force on September 30, 2016, lays a foundation 
for better translation of intellectual property issues into human rights advocacy on 
the domestic level. It does this in two ways: first, by identifying a clear violation (for 
example, a “book famine” for individuals with disabilities) that can be attributed to 
the effects of intellectual property rules (needing a license from the copyright owner 
in each country in order to create an accessible version of a book),1 and second, by 
activating domestic human rights advocates, naming them as explicit partners in 
intellectual property policy making and implementation on the domestic level. 
This Article makes two contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to 
human rights literature by providing a case study of the relationship between law 
and politics in social mobilization on intellectual property issues. Human rights 
operate simultaneously as a language of law and as a discourse of political action. 
Recent critiques of human rights by scholars such as Samuel Moyn2 and Stephen 
Hopgood3 focus on an overly narrow and legalistic vision of human rights that often 
prevents recognition of the more transformative potential of human rights as a 
frame for political action. 
Second, the Article contributes to the literature on human rights and 
intellectual property by identifying the barriers that have hampered efforts to use 
human rights frames to address the impacts of intellectual property and offering 
suggestions for the way forward. In so doing, it seeks to begin a discussion about 
what a human rights agenda for innovation would look like—an agenda that would 
put human rights front and center instead of deferring to the essential bargains and 
assumptions that underlie intellectual property law. 
 
1. See PAUL HARPUR, DISCRIMINATION, COPYRIGHT, AND EQUALITY: OPENING THE E-
BOOK FOR THE PRINT-DISABLED 80 (2017). 
2.  SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018) 
[hereinafter MOYN, NOT ENOUGH]; SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
HISTORY (2010). 
3.  STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013). 
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This Article proceeds in two parts. First, it charts the way in which intellectual 
property as a human rights issue was initially raised in South Africa and Brazil before 
being taken up by institutions within the United Nations. This part also discusses 
why intellectual property, once it was articulated as a human rights concern in these 
forums, did not further translate into domestic action. It identifies the barriers to 
this uptake as largely stemming from the decision by transnational intellectual 
property advocates to engage with IP rights-holders on rights-holders’ terms, using 
social justice rationales to advocate for exceptions and limitations to intellectual 
property rather than challenging the inequitable power relationships that undergird 
international intellectual property protection. Meeting intellectual property rights-
holders on their own terms may well have been a necessary strategic move in order 
to present arguments in terms that would resonate. Nonetheless, an unintended side 
effect of this move has been to limit opportunities to build alliances with human 
rights advocates. 
The second part of this Article discusses the core provisions of the Marrakesh 
Treaty as well as the way in which the unique features of the Treaty represent a new 
approach to intellectual property lawmaking. Normatively, the Treaty focuses on an 
issue that resonates well within the human rights framework, identifying a clear 
violator, violation, and remedy, and it is also associated with a clear constituency—
in this case, individuals with print disabilities and their representative organizations. 
These characteristics make it more likely for the intellectual property issues at the 
heart of the Treaty to be framed as human rights concerns. Institutionally, the 
Marrakesh Treaty also represents an advance over prior efforts to catalyze domestic 
human rights advocacy on intellectual property issues by ensuring that beneficiaries 
and their representative organizations will be able to participate in exercising the 
rights created by the Treaty as well as in lawmaking on the Treaty’s implementation. 
I. FRAMING HUMAN RIGHTS 
This section examines the “geography” of human rights framing of intellectual 
property, from initial deployment in South Africa and Brazil to elaboration and 
entrenchment at the United Nations. The section then considers why the trajectory 
of human rights and intellectual property “stalled” at the international level and was 
not translated into further domestic human rights advocacy. In large part, this lack 
of uptake was due to the fact that there was no clear constituency within the human 
rights community to take up these issues. In addition, the transnational and national 
activists who did engage with the social justice impacts of intellectual property 
tended to use the language and metrics of intellectual property to frame their work, 
which made the impacts of intellectual property less accessible by, and perceived as 
less relevant to, most human rights practitioners. 
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A. From South Africa to the United Nations 
Prior to the mid-1990s, there was little interaction between the intellectual 
property and human rights regimes.4 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, IP 
rights-holders began pressuring their constituent states to advocate for stronger 
global intellectual property rights.5 These efforts were successful, and in 1994, the 
negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS Agreement)6 made compliance with minimum intellectual property 
standards a requirement of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO).7 
The TRIPS Agreement and the later bilateral trade and investment treaties that 
sought to expand upon and strengthen its requirements, were combined with 
continued bilateral pressure to strengthen domestic intellectual property rules and 
enforce them more effectively. These forces created a culture of compliance that 
led many states to forego even the minimal flexibility that TRIPS allows ratifying 
states in implementing their obligations under the treaty.8 Many countries, including 
some of the least-developed countries, implemented their TRIPS obligations far in 
advance of when they were actually required to do so.9 Others adopted stronger 
rules than required by the treaty or declined to incorporate flexibilities allowed by 
TRIPS.10 Bilateral agreements further required states to provide “TRIPS-plus” 
protection beyond what was required by TRIPS.11 
The impacts of these stronger intellectual property rights began to engender 
significant resistance among several communities. Advocates argued that patents 
on essential medicines allowed pharmaceutical companies to charge prices that most 
 
4. Prior to the mid-1990s, the intellectual property and human rights regimes largely developed 
in isolation. See Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 47 (2003); see also Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual 
Property: Mapping an Evolving and Contested Relationship, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 117, 118 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Justine Pila eds., 2018) [hereinafter 
Helfer, OXFORD HANDBOOK]. 
5. LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 35 (2011). 
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The agreement was negotiated as part of a set of agreements concluded 
in 1994 that established the WTO, vested it with certain regulatory power, and strengthened the 
mechanism for resolving trade disputes. Annexed to the principal agreement establishing the WTO 
were topic-specific agreements regulating issues ranging from trade in goods and services to textiles 
and clothing, agriculture, and anti-dumping (collectively called the “covered agreements”). The TRIPS 
Agreement is one of these covered agreements and establishes minimum standards for intellectual 
property protection in the domestic law of WTO member states. 
7. Helfer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 121. 
8. Molly Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433, 442 (2012). 
9. CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE 
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 72–74 
(2008). 
10. See, e.g., id. at 73, 81, 91–94, 98 (describing instances where countries implemented the 
TRIPS Agreement in excess of required standards). According to Deere, “some of the countries with 
the highest IP protection were among the world’s poorest.” Id. at 102. 
11. Id. at 151–55. 
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individuals suffering from disease in developing countries could not afford.12 
Others argued that intellectual property rights diverted research toward the needs 
of developed countries’ health care markets.13 Constituencies concerned with the 
effects of stronger intellectual property rights on health were joined by those who 
were worried about their consequences for farmers and databases, among others. 
As Amy Kapczynski recounts in her analysis of the origins of the access to 
knowledge mobilization, resistance to the expansion of intellectual property law and 
concern about its effects on the public interest began in the early 1990s with protests 
by farmers over the TRIPS Agreement in India and mobilization around databases 
in the European Union.14 These and other concerns sparked protests around the 
social justice impacts of trade negotiations in Seattle in 1999.15 
Although advocacy around intellectual property and access to medicines dates 
back to the early 1990s,16 it was not framed as a human rights issue until later in that 
decade through the access to medicines movements in South Africa and Brazil. 
“Framing” is a particular way in which activists seek to legitimize their demands and 
identify desired outcomes.17 Schön and Rein describe “naming and framing” as 
processes in which “[t]hings are selected for attention and named in such a way as 
to fit the frame constructed for the situation.”18 These processes of naming and 
framing select for attention a few salient features and relations from what would 
 
12. See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach 
for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1047 (2005). 
13. See, e.g., Audrey R. Chapman, The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property 
Protection, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861, 877–78 (2002); Susan K. Sell, What Role for Humanitarian Intellectual 
Property? The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 192–93, 200 
(2004). 
14. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual 
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 826–27 (2008). 
15. Sean D. Murphy, Collapse of Efforts to Launch “Millennium” Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 375 (2000). 
16. Focusing on the origins of the access to medicines movement, de Mello e Souza explains 
that the transnational network that eventually emerged around access to HIV/AIDS drugs was 
originally a U.S.-based movement led by Ralph Nader and James Love of the Consumer Project on 
Technology (CPTech, now Knowledge Ecology International, KEI). The activists began with a focus 
on drug prices in the United States in the early 1990s, but turned their attention to concerns about 
international equity after the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement. See André de Mello e Souza, The 
Power of the Weak: Advocacy Networks, Ideational Change and the Global Politics of Pharmaceutical 
Patent Rights 136–37 (Feb. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with 
Marquette University Libraries). 
17. Molly Land, Human Rights Frames in IP Contests, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: 
THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA 276, 
279 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and César Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2014). Intellectual property rights-
holders also used a variety of frames to promote their objectives, including frames of theft and piracy. 
See Duncan Matthews, When Framing Meets Law: Using Human Rights as a Practical Instrument to 
Facilitate Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, in TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
TOWARDS A NEW IP WORLD ORDER? 12, 13 (Gustavo Ghidini et al. eds., 2014). 
18. DONALD A. SCHÖN & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLUTION 
OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES 26 (1994); see also DANA BELDIMAN, ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 209–10 (2013). 
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otherwise be an overwhelmingly complex reality. They give these elements a 
coherent organization, and they describe what is wrong with the present situation 
in such a way as to set the direction for its future transformation. Through the 
processes of naming and framing, the stories make the “normative leap” from data 
to recommendations, from fact to values, from “is” to “ought.”19 
Framing theory focuses on the cognitive structures employed by actors within 
social movements to give events meaning in ways that “organize experience and 
guide action, whether individual or collective.”20 Thus, “[a] human rights frame tells 
a story that characterizes the victims, labels the genre of abuse, locates the 
perpetrators, and suggests a response.”21 There are many ways in which grievances 
can be understood, and the choice of frame affects how people define the 
underlying problem and the remedies they seek.22 The initial framing of an issue is 
important, since “[w]ays of thinking about problems are generally path 
dependent.”23 
Activists in South Africa and Brazil first used the frame of human rights to 
articulate their demands for greater access to life-saving pharmaceuticals in order to 
protect the human rights to health and life.24 In South Africa, for example, the right 
to health was the central organizing element in the work of the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC), a community-based organization that took the lead in the South 
African effort to promote access to treatment in the context of HIV/AIDS.25 Using 
a combination of grassroots mobilization, prevention, treatment literacy campaigns, 
and litigation, TAC sought to “[c]hallenge by means of litigation, lobbying, advocacy 
and all forms of legitimate social mobilization, any barrier or obstacle, including 
unfair discrimination, that limits access to treatment for HIV/AIDS in the private 
 
19. SCHÖN & REIN, supra note 18. For another perspective on “the way in which experiences 
become grievances, grievances become disputes, and disputes take various shapes, follow particular 
dispute processing paths, and lead to new forms of understanding,” see William L.F. Felstiner,  
Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 632 (1980–81). In the framework of Felstiner et al., “naming” 
is when one first understands an experience to be an injurious event; “blaming” is when one attributes 
responsibility for that injury to another; and “claiming” is when one voices that grievance to the 
responsible entity and asks for remediation. Id. at 635. Framing operates throughout these processes to 
give salience to some facts over others and to provide direction about who should be responsible for 
what. 
20. David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 464 (1986). 
21. ALISON BRYSK, SPEAKING RIGHTS TO POWER: CONSTRUCTING POLITICAL WILL 78 
(2013). 
22. See Snow et al., supra note 20, at 465–66. 
23. Peggy Levitt & Sally Merry, Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women’s 
Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States, 9 GLOBAL NETWORKS 441, 452 (2009). 
24. See generally Land, supra note 17. 
25. Amy Kapczynski & Jonathan M. Berger, The Story of the TAC Case: The Potential and 
Limits of Socio-Economic Rights Litigation in South Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 43, 
44–45 (Deena R. Hurwitz & Margaret L. Satterthwaite eds., 2009). 
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and public sector.”26 TAC’s litigation over access to medicines explicitly invoked 
the right to health under the South African Constitution, which was modeled on 
and drew inspiration from international instruments protecting the international 
right to health.27 
Human rights shared a similarly prominent role in debates about access to 
medicines in Brazil. Although it currently boasts a robust program to combat HIV/
AIDS that features universal access, the Brazilian government’s initial efforts were 
largely ineffectual.28 The state’s response improved only after widespread civic 
mobilization within the gay community in São Paulo together with advocacy by 
health care reform activists, called the movimento sanitária.29 The movimento sanitária 
was led by human rights organizations that had come of age challenging the 
country’s military dictatorship by advocating for democratic health policy and 
universal access to health care.30 
Prior to the early 2000s, human rights authorities had paid little attention to 
intellectual property. The HIV/AIDS epidemic was increasingly being viewed as a 
human rights issue, but there was no discussion of the role of patents, despite a 
recognition that the price of medicines was inhibiting care. For example, the 
Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, produced by the United Nations in 
1998,31 emphasized the importance of affordability but failed to even mention the 
effect of patents on price. 
It was only after the initial framing of intellectual property as a human rights 
issue in South Africa and Brazil and the media attention generated by these 
movements in the late 1990s and early 2000s that human rights groups and 
institutions became involved.32 As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink note, 
“[m]any international norms began as domestic norms and become international 
through the efforts of entrepreneurs of various kinds . . . . In other words, there is 
a two-level norm game occurring in which the domestic and the international norm 
 
26. Mark Heywood, South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social 
Mobilization to Realize the Right to Health, 1 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 14, 15 (2009) (quoting the TAC 
Constitution). 
27. Winston P. Nagan, International Intellectual Property, Access to Health Care, and Human 
Rights: South Africa v. United States, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 155, 188–91 (2002). 
28. Eduardo J. Gómez, How Brazil Outpaced the United States When It Came to AIDS: The 
Politics of Civic Infiltration, Reputation, and Strategic Internalization, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 317, 
320 (2011). 
29. Id. 
30. Jane Galvão, Brazil and Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs: A Question of Human Rights and 
Public Health, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1110, 1112 (2005). 
31. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights & Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS, HIV/AIDS and Human Rights: International Guidelines, UN Doc. ST/HR/PUB/98/1 
(1998). 
32. See, e.g., Erika George, The Human Right to Health and HIV/AIDS: South Africa and South-
South Cooperation to Reframe Global Intellectual Property Principles and Promote Access to Essential 
Medicines, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 167, 187 (2011) (noting that other human rights institutions 
became involved in the issue of access to medicines after the controversy over the lawsuit challenging 
the amendments to the Medicines Act in South Africa). 
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tables are increasingly linked.”33 Thus, it was in the context of TAC’s South African 
lawsuit that Oxfam made one of the earliest invocation of the international human 
rights framework on issues of intellectual property. In 2001, it issued a press release 
in which it stated that “the companies’ court action against the South African 
government over its attempts to get cheap drugs to its people, prevent[s] the South 
African government from fulfilling its international human rights obligations.”34 
The early 2000s then saw international human rights organizations and 
institutions engaged in a veritable flurry of activism and lawmaking activity in the 
area of intellectual property.35 This included a General Comment by the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the role of medicines in ensuring the 
right to health36 as well as a very influential resolution of the U.N. Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights entitled “Intellectual Property 
Rights and Human Rights.”37 In 2001 alone, there was a report by the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the impact of TRIPS on human rights,38 a 
report by the U.N. Secretary General on intellectual property and human rights,39 
and a resolution by the Commission on Human Rights calling on states to pursue 
policies that promote access to medicines as a part of the right to health.40 Forman 
calls the flurry of activity on the international level a “norm cascade” precipitated 
by media furor over the South African litigation.41 
The 2006 revision of the Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights 
demonstrates this shift in framing most clearly. Between 1998 and 2006, Guideline 
6, which addresses the accessibility of medicines, was revised to make explicit the 
need for equal and sustained availability of “antiretroviral and other safe and 
 
33. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 
52 INT’L ORG. 887, 893 (1998). 
34. Lissett Ferreira, Note 196: Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights 
Obligations of Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133 (2002) (quoting 
Press Release, Oxfam, Oxfam Says: Drug Giant Set to Cause Violation of Human Rights: Oxfam Calls 
for Urgent UN Investigation (Nov. 4, 2001)). Of course, efforts to address HIV/AIDS in South Africa 
were also frustrated by AIDS denialism, a position promoted by then-President Thabo Mbeki and other 
South African government officials. Kapczynski, supra note 14, at 852 & n.221. They argued “that HIV 
does not cause AIDS, that HIV/AIDS drugs are toxic, and that such drugs are in fact a possible cause 
of AIDS itself” and they rejected calls for access to medicines. Id. at 852 n.221. 
35. See generally HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 53–56. 
36. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
37. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000). 
38. Comm’n on Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 ( June 27, 2001). 
39. U.N. Secretary-General, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
2001/12 ( June 14, 2001). 
40. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Fifty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/
L.50 (Apr. 12, 2001). 
41. Lisa Forman, “Rights” and Wrongs: What Utility for the Right to Health in Reforming Trade 
Rules on Medicines?, 10 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 37, 44 (2008). 
Final to Printer_Land (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:37 AM 
522 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 8:513 
effective medicines, diagnostics and related technologies for preventive, curative 
and palliative care of HIV and related opportunistic infections and conditions,” 
particularly to vulnerable individuals and populations.42 In addition, the new 
Guidelines contain an extensive discussion of intellectual property. They note the 
responsibility of states, in both their domestic and international activities, to make 
sure that intellectual property laws and international instruments do not impede 
access to medicines, diagnostics, or related technologies,43 and caution states to 
utilize flexibilities in these agreements to the fullest extent possible.44 
In part, the new emphasis on antiretrovirals and other forms of treatment was 
a reflection of changes in what de Mello e Souza calls the “conventional wisdom on 
health policy.”45 Prior to the late 1990s, institutions ranging from the World Bank 
to the Gates Foundation had concluded that in resource-poor settings, funding 
should be directed toward HIV/AIDS prevention, not treatment, because the 
barriers to treatment—from a lack of infrastructure to resistance risks of 
inconsistent treatment—made prevention more cost-effective.46 Activism in the late 
1990s began changing that perception. Pointing to Brazil’s universal access policy 
and the real costs of lack of treatment,47 activists argued that decreases in the cost 
of generic anti-retrovirals—to just over one dollar a day—made failure to treat 
morally indefensible.48 
With new possibilities for care, the human rights frame became even more 
salient. Because treatment began to be seen as feasible even in low-resource settings, 
the failure to make provision for such treatment was more easily framed as a 
violation of the right to life and to health. Moral claims were thus paired with the 
language of rights to support a demand for access to treatment as a human right. 
This is reflected in the 2006 Guidelines’ emphasis on state obligations to take 
advantage of IP treaty flexibilities in order to satisfy their obligations under human 
rights treaties. 
After the early 2000s, however, the pace of international framing of access to 
medicines as a human rights issue slowed considerably. Human rights institutions 
continued to consider the intersection of human rights and intellectual property, 
including through a 2006 interpretive comment of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights on creator’s rights.49 At the same time, a 2009 interpretive 
 
42. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights & Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS, International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, 2006 Consolidated Version, 
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/09 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Guidelines]. 
43. Id. ¶ 52. 
44. Id. ¶ 53. 
45. De Mello e Souza, supra note 16, at 146. 
46. Id. at 146–50. 
47. Id. at 149–54. 
48. Amanda Barratt, The Curious Absence of Human Rights: Can the WIPO Development Agenda 
Transform Intellectual Property Negotiation?, 14 L. DEMOCRACY & DEV. 14, 19 (2010). 
49. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone 
to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, 
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comment on the right to take part in cultural life makes no mention of intellectual 
property rights,50 despite the importance of copyright on the ability to create and 
enjoy cultural works. 
Most recently, however, the impact of intellectual property on human rights 
was discussed by the last U.N. Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, 
Farida Shaheed. Special Rapporteur Shaheed focused all of her work in 2015 on the 
subject of intellectual property and its relationship to culture, issuing a series of very 
influential reports discussing patent51 and copyright policy.52 These reports have 
been very important in terms of the normative framing they provide and in keeping 
these issues on the agenda of the United Nations.53 
Yet despite initial mobilizations around human rights and intellectual property 
rights in South Africa and Brazil and then the considerable attention paid to these 
issues by United Nations institutions and experts, these issues have not translated 
down to further human rights advocacy on the domestic level. Transnational and 
domestic advocacy groups are challenging the expansion of intellectual property 
rules—just not in human rights terms. For example, in a 2009 study of advocacy 
around access to medicines in eleven Latin American countries, these issues were 
largely not framed in human rights terms, despite the social justice orientation of 
the study.54 Further, although there has been some framing of access to medicine 
as an issue of human rights, particularly in the context of litigation of the right to 
health in Latin America,55 human rights advocates have not engaged with the 
broader social welfare and human rights impacts of intellectual property. 
B. Barriers to Domestic Translation 
Focusing on the horizontal and vertical “geography” of human rights and 
intellectual property56 reveals that human rights approaches to intellectual property 
 
Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1 (c), of the 
Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 ( Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter General Comment No. 17]. 
50. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 21: Right of Everyone to 
Take Part in Cultural Life (Art. 15, Para. 1 (a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), U.N. DOC. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009). 
51. Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural 
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/70/279 (Aug. 4, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Shaheed Report]. 
52. Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural 
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/57 (Dec. 24, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Shaheed Report]. 
53. Peter K. Yu, The Anatomy of the Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 69 SMU 
L. REV. 37, 41 (2016). 
54. Land, supra note 17, at 277. 
55. See generally LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO 
HEALTH? (Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds., 2011); Benjamin Mason Meier et al., Employing 
Human Rights Frameworks to Realize Access to an HIV Cure, 18 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y 2 (2015). 
56. This focus on the geography of human rights and intellectual property draws on the work 
of political scientists who study norm evolution and social mobilization. See MARGARET E. KECK & 
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1998); Kathryn Sikkink, Patterns of Dynamic Multi-Level Governance and the Insider-Outsider 
Coalition, in TRANSNATIONAL PROTEST AND GLOBAL ACTIVISM 151, 156 (Donatella della Porta & 
Sidney Tarrow eds., 2005). It also draws on the work of legal scholars who address geographic scale in 
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were internationalized after their initial deployment in South Africa and Brazil, but 
that they then remained “stuck” at the United Nations. In the 2000s, for example, 
there continued to be considerable attention to human rights and intellectual 
property at the international level,57 to the point where one scholar argued that 
human rights advocates have been successful in “captur[ing] or coloniz[ing] well-
known elements of the international IP system.”58 These arguments, however, were 
primarily made by experts and elites at the international level. The normative 
framings that the United Nations expert and political bodies provided were not 
taken up again in domestic contexts. 
This incomplete translation is in part a result of choices made both by activists 
groups in prioritizing their work, as well as by transnational advocates in seeking to 
raise concern about issues of intellectual property. In particular, the social justice 
dimensions of IP policies were framed as issues of “access to knowledge,” which 
provided important tools for challenging the innovation narrative of IP rights-
holders, but further crowded out human rights as a frame for understanding the 
welfare effects of patents and copyrights. 
1. Legal Embeddedness 
As an initial matter, whether intellectual property was framed as a matter of 
human rights was in part a function of legal strategy. The countries in which 
advocates used human rights frames to tackle intellectual property issues were also 
countries in which human rights were more firmly embedded in national law and 
public discourse.59 
Human rights norms are more commonly used to frame intellectual property 
discussions when these norms are embedded in domestic constitutional law. Such 
embeddedness imbues the activists’ claims with additional legitimacy and makes 
human rights claims more powerful because they can be enforced against the state. 
In South Africa, for example, human rights norms are explicitly part of national 
constitutional law, which guarantees the right “to have access to health care 
services.”60 The existence of this right on the books was a strategic resource in the 
South African campaign for access to medicines and a critical factor in TAC’s 
adoption of a human rights frame in challenging the role of intellectual property in 
making medicines unaffordable. As Heywood notes, “by framing drug company 
profiteering as a rights violation and challenging it with reference to the South 
African Constitution, TAC made it an issue that demanded a legal remedy.”61 
 
the design of regulatory systems. See Hari M. Osofsky, The Complexities of Multipolar Approaches to 
Climate Change: Lessons from Litigation and Local Action, 107 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 73 (2013). 
57. Helfer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 125–28. 
58. HENNING GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 261 (2016). 
59. Land, supra note 17, at 278–79. 
60. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 27. 
61. Heywood, supra note 26, at 20. 
Final to Printer_Land (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:37 AM 
2018] THE MARRAKESH TREATY 525 
In Brazil, as well, access to health care is a constitutional right, protected in 
Article 196 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.62 The Constitution establishes the 
Unified Health System (SUS, or Sistema Único de Saúde), which provides for a 
universal public health care system open to all regardless of means.63 The 1988 
Constitution, described as a “socially provocative [and] somewhat left-leaning 
[document,] . . . emphasizing human rights and providing universal health care,” has 
been an important factor in Brazil’s success in ensuring access to medicines for 
those with HIV/AIDS.64 Access to medicines is also embedded in Brazilian 
legislation. Law 9.313, promulgated in 1996, requires the government to provide 
those with HIV/AIDS “all medication necessary for their treatment.”65 The 
embeddedness of the right to health in Brazilian law played an important role in 
driving health care policy on access to medicines and to treatment.66 
The use of a human rights frame in these situations offered the advantage of 
clarity as well as a narrative that emphasized justice and morality rather than 
incentives and cost. In their engagement with policymakers, the pharmaceutical 
industry had been relying on the rationales underlying intellectual property law to 
explain the debate in terms advantageous to itself—namely, in terms that focused 
on the cost of innovation. The complexity of this area of law also allowed industry 
to obscure the consequences of policy choices around intellectual property.67 
Human rights law, with its focus on the individual, allowed activists to tell a 
much simpler story. Zackie Achmat, for example, the chairperson of TAC, 
explained that this was an issue of “greed on the one hand and the right to life on 
the other.”68 A human rights framework also placed the impact of IP policies on 
individuals on the same level as their effect on innovation and development.69 
Although human rights are not necessarily trumps, the use of the human rights 
frame communicated that individual rights cannot simply be “traded for private 
 
62. De Mello e Souza, supra note 16, at 179; see also DUNCAN MATTHEWS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF NGOS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
127 (2011). 
63. Virgílio Afonso da Silva & Fernanda Vargas Terrazas, Claiming the Right to Health in 
Brazilian Courts: The Exclusion of the Already Excluded?, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 825, 829 (2011); see 
also Galvão, supra note 30. 
64. Paul J. Flaer & Mustafa Z. Younis, The Brazilian Experiment: HIV Drugs for All, 36  
J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 90, 92 (2009). 
65. Florian F. Hoffmann & Fernando R.N.M. Bentes, Accountability for Social and Economic 
Rights in Brazil, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL  
AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 100, 127 (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks 
eds., 2008). 
66. Id. at 136–38 (noting that although access to medicines litigation did not lead to the 1996 
law, litigation around access to medicines “show[s] that litigation can work as a signalizing mechanism 
for demand for new medicines, and, hence, for the expansion of an existing public policy”). 
67. De Mello e Souza, supra note 16, at 8. 
68. AIDS Drugs Case Adjourned, CNN (Apr. 18, 2001, 8:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/africa/04/18/safrica.drugs.02/ [ https://perma.cc/FS8Z-8ABY]. 
69. Heinz Klug, Campaigning for Life: Building a New Transnational Solidarity in the Face of 
HIV/AIDS and TRIPS, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN 
LEGALITY 118, 137 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005). 
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property interests or domestic economic growth.”70 This is not to say that incentives 
and innovation are not important. Rather, the deployment of human rights language 
in this context illustrates the way in which human rights provide a foundation for 
activism and organizing that enables advocates to describe an alternate set of values, 
concerns, and costs at stake in the pricing of medicines. 
2. Social Embeddedness 
For human rights to be effectively implemented into meaningful action, more 
than legal embeddedness is required. Domestic translation of intellectual property 
issues into human rights terms also depends on who takes up these issues and the 
way in which the issues are framed by these actors. Human rights frames require 
social embeddedness—the involvement of organizations that use human rights 
norms and institutions in their advocacy work as well as an awareness of human 
rights within public discourse. 
The existence of an organization that had been exposed to, and had experience 
with, international human rights norms appears to be an important determinant of 
whether human rights law was used to frame intellectual property disputes. In 
tackling any human rights issue, advocates are simultaneously engaged in acts of 
framing and translation—framing the issue as a question of human rights and also 
translating the concepts of international human rights law into local terms. Sally 
Engle Merry and Peggy Levitt explain that translation, or vernacularization, is the 
process of appropriation and local adoption of international norms.71 As norms 
move from one context to another, images and symbols are translated into local 
cultural narratives and thereby transformed in the process.72 To Merry, the work of 
intermediaries in this process is crucial.73 
The choice of intermediary also influences whether the issue will be framed in 
terms of human rights. When intermediaries with experience in human rights were 
the first to respond to a problem caused by the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, the problem was much more likely to be defined in human rights terms. The 
importance of human rights “first responders” in putting intellectual property into 
a human rights context is particularly evident in the case of South Africa. In South 
Africa, human rights had been a central component of TAC’s work from the very 
start.74 In large part, this orientation was a function of TAC’s leadership. The 
chairman of TAC, Zackie Achmat, had been active in the United Democratic Front, 
which had used a human rights approach to challenge apartheid.75 TAC also formed 
alliances with lawyers and other organizations, such as the Law and Treatment 
 
70. Forman, supra note 41, at 39. 
71. Levitt & Merry, supra note 23, at 446. 
72. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS & GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 136 (2006). 
73. Id. at 229. 
74. Heywood, supra note 26. 
75. Matthews, supra note 17, at 17–18. 
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Access Unit of the AIDS Law Project, which used a human rights frame for their 
work.76 
Human rights were also socially embedded in the public discourse of South 
Africa as a result of the transition from apartheid. As Heinz Klug notes, the 
transition from apartheid and South Africa’s ratification of the TRIPS Agreement 
occurred nearly simultaneously.77 The transition from apartheid resulted in a strong 
rights consciousness both within TAC and the general public, and played an 
important role in framing the issue of medicines in terms of human rights.78 As 
Duncan Matthews explains, “TAC’s formation was grounded in . . . a distinctly 
post-apartheid period of South Africa’s history when human rights issues were 
particularly to the fore and, by linking the right to health to human rights principles, 
TAC shared historical continuities with the late 1980s and early 1990s anti-apartheid 
and gay rights activism.”79 Indeed, TAC’s advocacy strategy expressly drew on the 
symbols of the anti-apartheid struggle. For example, TAC commemorated Human 
Rights Day in 2003 by organizing a march in support of access to treatment to a 
police station where anti-apartheid protestors had been killed in 1960.80 
In Brazil, human rights were also deeply embedded both in public discourse 
and in the practices of the organizations that first worked for access to medicines. 
Human rights played an important role in Brazil’s transition from a military 
dictatorship in 1985 and, as a result, “held a special place in the national psyche.”81 
As Jane Galvão explains, “[t]he dismantling of authoritarian rule in Brazil was 
accompanied by a strong orientation toward human rights, which formed the 
sociopolitical framework of Brazil’s response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.”82 It was 
during this period in the early 1980s, as Brazil was transitioning from 
authoritarianism, that activists within the democratization movement began 
working to recognize health care as an individual right.83 This movimento sanitária 
sought a variety of reforms for the health care system, including greater participation 
and universal and free access to care, and it led directly to the creation of the SUS.84 
The movimento sanitária not only created a legal framework establishing health 
as a fundamental human right,85 it also socialized activists to think of health issues 
in rights terms. Human rights organizations within the movimento sanitária—those 
 
76. Id. at 18; see also Heywood, supra note 26, at 21. 
77. Klug, supra note 69, at 126. 
78. Land, supra note 17, at 278; see also MATTHEWS, supra note 62, at 95. 
79. Matthews, supra note 17, at 17. 
80. Klug, supra note 69, at 118. 
81. MATTHEWS, supra note 62, at 237. 
82. Galvão, supra note 30, at 1110. 
83. Id. at 1112. 
84. De Mello e Souza, supra note 16, at 179. 
85. See id. (arguing that Brazil’s AIDS treatment program, the first to establish universal access 
and widely viewed as groundbreaking in the area of access to treatment, “was made possible by the 
accomplishments of an extensive movement for health reform and democracy that incorporated in the 
country’s 1988 Constitution a conception of health as a right of citizenship and created a new health 
system based on the principles of integrality and community participation”). 
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who had also opposed the country’s military dictatorship and advocated for a 
democratic health policy and universal access to health care during the transition—
allied with civic groups in the gay community to lead the challenge to the 
government’s response to HIV/AIDS.86 These activists used strategies, including 
the demand for democratized access to information and the defense of human 
rights, that had been effective in challenging military regime.87 Many in this 
movement eventually became part of the government and continued to work in 
support of access to medicines in their new positions.88 
3. Competing Frames & Crowding Out 
Why did human rights constituencies in other countries not take up issues of 
intellectual property? There are certainly domestic human rights groups in many 
countries that are active on a range of issues affected by IP policies—including the 
rights to health, food, education, and freedom of expression, among others. In part, 
it may simply have been that the transnational advocates that raised IP issues in 
these contexts were not initially connected with domestic human rights groups, but 
rather with other advocacy groups that relied on different frames. In contrast to 
Brazil and South Africa, where the activists leading the campaign thought of 
themselves as human rights advocates, in other countries, those leading the 
mobilization around IP policy identified more closely as trade or consumer 
protection organizations.89 Although international human rights institutions began 
addressing issues of intellectual property in the early 2000s, this framing was not 
taken up by transnational advocacy networks. Only one of the organizations that 
continued to work on issues of access to knowledge, an organization called 
3DThree, explicitly used a human rights framework to do so.90 
A second and more fundamental reason, however, relates to the way in which 
these issues were framed in transnational and then domestic activism in many 
countries. After the mid-2000s, international regulatory activity, lawmaking, and 
activism on intellectual property and the public interest began to coalesce around a 
frame of “access to knowledge” or A2K, which allowed new groups of activists—
from farmers to doctors to open source software engineers—to make common 
cause.91 This frame of “access to knowledge” allowed advocates with otherwise 
divergent agendas to mobilize around social justice concerns with a variety of 
different kinds of intellectual property impacts. 
 
86. Gómez, supra note 28; see also Galvão, supra note 30. 
87. Galvão, supra note 30; see also Matthews, supra note 17, at 21. 
88. Gómez, supra note 28, at 321 (activists “gradually filtered into state AIDS programs and 
health institutions” and once there were able to support the work of HIV/AIDS organizations). 
89. Land, supra note 17, at 279. 
90. See 3D Completes Its Work, 3D-TRADE-HUMAN RIGHTS-EQUITABLE ECONOMY,  
http://www.3dthree.org/en/pages.php?IDcat=15 [ https://web.archive.org/web/20120413142848/ 
http://www.3dthree.org/en/pages.php?IDcat=15] ( last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
91. Kapczynski, supra note 14, at 807. 
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In connecting these disparate IP-related issues, the A2K frame implicitly relied 
on the language and metrics of intellectual property. In part, this is due to historical 
contingencies; much of the work of this mobilization arose as a response to 
increasingly strong intellectual property rights, and advocates naturally took up 
these arguments in crafting their responses. The focus on intellectual property 
within the A2K movement is also practical, a reflection of the dominant role that 
intellectual property plays in regulating the distribution of, access to, and the ability 
to utilize, knowledge. Gaëlle Krikorian argues that the focus on intellectual property 
is “undoubtedly inevitable, because A2K advocates are engaged in discussing and 
criticizing the effects of intellectual property rights, and consequently they 
incorporate the legal language that articulates those rights and engage with the 
institutional frame that produces them.”92 Amy Kapczynski notes that over time, 
“the discourse of access-to-medicines campaigners has become intimately bound 
up with the logic of intellectual property, because their attempt to contest the 
legitimacy narrative of intellectual property law has drawn them into the economic 
discourse that dominates the field.”93 
Those using the A2K frame tend to make arguments in terms of economic 
development and incentives to innovate, the dominant modes of intellectual 
property law. Although they deny that intellectual property is required for 
innovation, the logic of this mobilization has nonetheless accepted innovation as a 
primary metric of evaluation. As Kapczynski explains, “while the A2K mobilization 
sometimes makes claims in the idiom of culture, equality, or human rights, many—
and perhaps most—of its claims are made within the framework of information 
economics and the incentive effects of IP systems.”94 In addition, many of the 
organizing devices of this mobilization—the public domain and the commons—
draw on fundamental concepts of property law.95 
The focus on innovation and intellectual property has been important for the 
A2K movement in several ways. First, the efficacy of the A2K frame is in part 
derived from its central location in IP discourse; this basis has provided a strong 
foundation for deepening the engagement with the IP rationales with which human 
rights advocates have less expertise and comfort.96 Second, the shift away from 
human rights was also a result of concerns that human rights discourse could be 
and was being hijacked by IP owners to justify stronger intellectual property  
rights.97 IP rights-owners were using the language of fundamental rights to diffuse 
 
92. Gaëlle Krikorian, Access to Knowledge as a Field of Activism, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 
IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 57, 68 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010). 
93. Amy Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge: A Conceptual Genealogy, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 
IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17, 38 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010). 
94. Kapczynski, supra note 14, at 866. 
95. Kapczynski, supra note 93, at 30. 
96. Land, supra note 17, at 282–83. The diverging rationales and expertise are part of the reason 
the regimes evolved in isolation from one another. See Helfer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 
121. 
97. Land, supra note 17, at 282–83. 
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competing human rights claims to limit intellectual property rights. Finally, 
mobilization around the concept of A2K also provided advocates with a way of 
seeing how innovation policies, writ large, affect our ability to take part in and enjoy 
the products of scientific knowledge and innovation.98 The “gravitational pull” of 
intellectual property law that Kapczynski identifies99 resulted from the way in which 
an intellectual property frame allowed advocates to connect disparate issues under 
a common heading to better challenge the bargains reflected in intellectual property 
law. 
Nonetheless, this focus on intellectual property also had the effect of crowding 
out alternative narratives around the human rights impact of intellectual property. 
Kapczynski observes that “groups in the A2K mobilization implicitly reject 
alternative alliances and frameworks when they suture themselves to one another 
through the rubric of IP.”100 First, the focus on intellectual property discouraged 
engagement by human rights groups because of the perceived need for expertise in 
intellectual property law that would be costlier to obtain than the benefits it would 
bring. Second, the lens of intellectual property law limited the extent to which 
human rights organizations, which tended not to have experience working on issues 
of intellectual property law and policy, viewed themselves as natural allies for 
advocacy on these issues. Third, the attenuated connection between intellectual 
property and human rights harms in many cases made it difficult to identify a 
“violation” that demanded attention as a matter of priority. Copyright contributes 
to the limited availability of textbooks in developing countries, but there are many 
other factors affecting the right to education or to culture that may seem more 
pressing. Fourth, the complexity of violations once identified made it challenging 
to use human rights tools to advocate on these issues. If copyright is only one 
among many reasons affecting access to books, it is more challenging for advocates 
to pressure those who might have the power to increase access. 
Expertise. The focus on intellectual property made this set of issues seem 
inaccessible to those who might not have expertise in intellectual property law.101 
Human rights organizations are often highly risk averse because of the limited 
resources with which they have to work.102 Faced with the prospect of investing 
time and energy to develop expertise and compared to highly pressing immediate 
needs, expanding their work to address intellectual property policy issues may have 
been beyond their capacity. As Levitt and Merry note, “the easier diffused material 
is to comprehend, theorize and put into place, the quicker it is adopted.”103 
 
98. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOMS (2007). 
99. Kapczynski, supra note 14, at 860. 
100. Id. at 865. 
101. Land, supra note 17, at 284. 
102. Ella McPherson, Risk and the Pluralism of Digital Human Rights Fact-Finding and 
Advocacy, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 188, 190 (Molly K. Land 
& Jay D. Aronson eds., 2018). 
103. Levitt & Merry, supra note 23, at 444. 
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Constituencies. The emphasis on the logics and language of intellectual property 
also meant that there was no natural human rights constituency to take up these 
issues. Normative frame diffusion depends on the existence of agents of 
transmission—the presence of actors who are able to articulate and maintain 
particular messages.104 Framing involves three principal tasks—identifying the 
problem, developing solutions, and motivating adherents.105 There are many ways 
in which grievances can be understood, and the choice of frame affects how people 
define the underlying problem and the remedies they seek.106 
A human rights frame is rights-driven—that is, it is oriented toward and 
around individual rights, and it defines the problem accordingly. Thus, human rights 
organizations view themselves as focused on “health” or “education” or “civil 
liberties.” A2K concerns, in contrast, were framed as concerns about “intellectual 
property.” In other words, A2K advocates defined their work in terms of the cause 
of the problem, rather than the problem itself—but human rights groups do not 
organize their work in this way. Framing the issue in terms of the problem 
(intellectual property) rather than the right at issue (e.g., health or education) made 
it less likely that human rights constituencies would see these issues as relevant to 
their work. 
In many instances, efforts to frame intellectual property as a human rights 
issue were also driven by states themselves. In the context of intellectual property, 
states have engaged in considerable regime shifting—moving the issue of 
intellectual property from the WIPO to the WTO to the UN107 and today to the 
investment arbitration regime108—to seek alternative avenues to obtain 
authoritative statements supporting their legal and political goals. The shift to 
human rights forums was similarly advanced in part by developing states seeking 
ways to expand the policy space available to them under international intellectual 
property rules. Non-governmental organizations also played an important role in 
 
104. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms 
into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 5 (Thomas Risse, Stephen 
C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999) (“The diffusion of international norms in the human rights area 
crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and 
transnational actors who manage to link up with international regimes, to alert Western public opinion 
and Western governments.”). 
105. Robert Benford & David Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and 
Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 611, 615 (2000) (referring to these tasks as “diagnostic framing,” 
“prognostic framing,” and “motivational framing”). As Benford and Snow explain: 
Collective action frames are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared 
understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, 
make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of 
arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change. 
Id. 
106. See Snow et al., supra note 20, at 465–66. 
107. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics 
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004). 
108. James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and Enforcement from the 
WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 427 (2017). 
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this framing, including by initiating what became the UN Sub-Commission’s 
Resolution 2000/7 on human rights and intellectual property.109 Nonetheless, 
governments typically resist human rights framings to avoid accountability; in the 
context of intellectual property, however, they embraced this framing as a way of 
pushing back on international rules that limited their domestic authority.  
Violation. For human rights advocacy, enforcement mechanisms are often 
lacking on both the domestic and international levels. As a result, one of the most 
common enforcement mechanisms is the deployment of shame. Ken Roth, 
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, famously argued that advocacy on 
issues of economic rights is often unsuccessful because strategies based on shame 
are most effective when it is possible to identify a specific violation, violator, and 
remedy.110  
Clarity about the violation can be difficult to achieve in the context of IP 
policy. For example, IP policies may be only one of many causes of rights violations. 
For example, while copyright is certainly one among many factors that contribute 
to the lack of textbooks for schools,111 it is clearly not the only barrier. The extent 
to which copyright functions as a barrier also depends, for example, on the capacity 
of the state to create textbooks, as well as the extent to which there are authors who 
are able to write these textbooks, salaries to pay the authors, presses to print them, 
and trucks to deliver them.112 Even when human rights constituencies see the 
relevance of intellectual property to their work, the more attenuated causal 
connection between IP policies and human rights harms in many cases may make 
it more difficult to justify taking up these issues as policy priorities. 
Advocacy in Central America around the intellectual property provisions of 
the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) provides a good example of 
diverging priorities in the work of A2K and human rights advocates.113 Godoy notes 
that this was “undeniably a top-down story” in which the focus on intellectual 
property was driven by transnational groups rather than local human rights 
 
109.  David Weissbrodt & Kell Schoff, Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property Protection: 
The Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1,  
26 (2003). 
110. Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 63–73 (2004). Although Roth’s argument 
is not necessarily an indictment of the ability of human rights organizations to work on economic rights 
issues, its emphasis on the challenges of this work has been used to marginalize and depoliticize these 
rights in ways that make it difficult for human rights organizations to grapple with the impact of 
globalization. Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance, New 
Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1,  
71–72 (2010). 
111. Lea Shaver, Copyright and Inequality, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 117 (2014). 
112. See generally HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 359–60; Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property 
“from Below”: Copyright and Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 832–33 (2007). 
113. Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, CAFTA, Intellectual Property, and the Right to Health in 
Central America, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA 111, 126 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & César 
Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2014). 
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groups.114 Local civil society groups had a hard time getting interested in the issue 
of intellectual property because “IP intersected only peripherally with the central 
concerns of longstanding health rights advocates in Central America.”115 Godoy 
explains that, although “access to medicines has been a key concern of many in the 
region, the issue has historically been framed in terms of the dysfunctionality of 
state institutions in charge of purchasing and administering drugs, rather than the 
impact of international market forces on prices.”116 Although the intellectual 
property provisions of CAFTA had important consequences for the right to 
health—and, like many violations of the right to health, were related to the failure 
of the state to organize itself in ways that ensure the right to health—transnational 
intellectual property advocacy groups were not able to articulate their concerns in 
ways that resonated with local human rights activists. 
The difficulty of identifying a violation can be compounded by the absence of 
empirical evidence demonstrating the impact of intellectual property on rights such 
as education or cultural participation. As Jo Becker examines in her study of human 
rights mobilization, research is essential in catalyzing, supporting, and legitimizing 
the demands of rights-holders.117 There is a need for more research on the extent 
to which the enforcement of intellectual property rules (such as copyright) results 
in human rights harms (such as a chilling effect on downstream expression and 
creativity). 
Differing conceptions of public and private between A2K and human rights 
advocates also contribute to the way in which they each understand the nature of 
the violation, and, relatedly, identify solutions. For example, many of the solutions 
promoted by the A2K mobilization involve increasing the discretionary authority 
that states have under international intellectual property treaties to develop 
domestic policy. Human rights advocates, in contrast, tend to focus their work on 
the need to enforce more rigorously the constraints that international treaties place 
on states to respect rights, as well as for greater positive obligations on states to 
protect and fulfill rights.118 These different perspectives on the nature of the 
violation complicates the solutions each group proposes, particularly in terms of 
their respective comfort with market-based solutions and with the involvement of 
private entities in providing public goods. 
Advocacy around the impact of CAFTA on access to medicines again 
illustrates these different levels of comfort with private remedies. A2K advocates 
often promote the production of generic medicines as a way of bringing down prices 
and making medicines more affordable. Godoy explains, however, that advocacy 
groups in Central America resisted the intellectual property agenda because of a lack 
 
114. Id. at 127. 
115. Id. at 117. 
116. Id. 
117. JO BECKER, CAMPAIGNING FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY IN 
PRACTICE 251–53 (2013). 
118. See Molly Beutz Land, Protecting Rights Online, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2009). 
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of trust in the quality of generic production and a concern that the generic producers 
would also charge high prices.119 Local health rights advocates were less willing to 
adopt the A2K frame given the poor track record of local generic producers in terms 
of safety and consumer protection. 
Complexity. The impact of intellectual property on human rights is not a simple 
story to tell. Clearly, the way in which knowledge is incentivized and produced, and 
our incentives for doing so, affects the ability to promote and protect all human 
rights. In any individual case, however, it is more challenging to establish 
connections between IP policy and a specific rights violation. Yet human rights 
campaigns are most successful when they can tell a clear causal story and identify 
those responsible for the harm in a direct and concise manner.120 Keck and Sikkink 
explain, for example, that successful transnational advocacy tends to feature two 
kinds of issues: “(1) issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially 
when there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility; and 
(2) issues involving legal equality.”121 Often, this kind of clear causal story is not 
available for issues at the interface of intellectual property and human rights. 
Medicine and health is an easier case; in South Africa and Brazil, it was possible to 
directly connect the introduction of patents to increases in the cost of anti-
retrovirals. In other areas, however, such as culture or education, intellectual 
property often affects individuals rights in a much more indirect way. 
II.  WHY HUMAN RIGHTS? 
Should we be concerned with this crowding out, with the failure of human 
rights organizations to more consistently take up issues of intellectual property? 
After all, it may simply be that human rights frames are helpful in some situations 
and not in others, and there is no need for intellectual property to be seen as a 
“human rights” issue. This section argues that a human rights framing of intellectual 
property is helpful because it provides a basis for challenging the fundamental 
power inequities that undergird the international intellectual property regime.  
This section then argues that for this framing to be effective, it needs to engage 
local constituencies that have interests in the creation of domestic innovation 
systems oriented on the fulfillment of human rights. First, domestic constituencies 
are best positioned to press for political change. Thinking of human rights only in 
terms of the law is an incomplete model: human rights needs to be understood not 
just as law, but law “in practice.” Second, domestic human rights constituencies 
need to be involved in capacity building. Because of the unique features of the 
 
119. Godoy, supra note 113, at 117. 
120. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 56, at 27. 
121. Id.; see also MATTHEWS, supra note 62 at 85 (observing less advocacy “where the direct 
impact of intellectual property rights is less clear, with no victims readily identifiable and the intellectual 
property issues involved often seen as complex, distant and moreover primarily a problem for the 
Global South”); Roth, supra note 110, at 67–68 (arguing that human rights advocacy is most effective 
when it is possible to identify a clear violator, violation, and remedy). 
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intellectual property conundrum, which results not only from state unwillingness to 
respect and ensure rights but also from the state’s inability to legislate in ways that 
promote human rights, capacity-building is key. Domestic human rights 
constituencies are uniquely poised to augment national capacity-building in 
furtherance of human rights. 
A.  The Contributions of a Human Rights Frame 
What is lost through an incomplete translation of IP policy into human rights 
terms? Clearly, not every social justice harm needs to be conceptualized within a 
human rights frame, and the A2K frame has been very effective in providing a 
platform for countering the arguments of rights-holders about the need for strong 
intellectual property rights.  
In considering the contribution of human rights to discussions about 
intellectual property, many initially focused on the way in which human rights law 
might provide an important limit on or complement to intellectual property law. 
Scholars, for example, have explored different ways of understanding the 
relationship between these two regimes. Larry Helfer has written extensively on this 
relationship, identifying among other things, the way in which intellectual property 
and human rights norms can conflict and coexist with one another.122 Others have 
addressed whether intellectual property rights are human rights, are not human 
rights, or are something in between.123 Another body of literature considers the 
impact of intellectual property rights on human rights and possible strategies for 
reconciling these two fields,124 while others have focused on systematic 
inconsistencies between human rights and intellectual property.125 
The United Nations experts and institutions that have examined the 
relationship between intellectual property and human rights have further deepened 
our understanding of the relationship between human rights and intellectual 
property law. This includes, among other things, the General Comments on Article 
15,126 the work of Special Rapporteur Farida Shaheed,127 reports by the U.N. High 
 
122. See generally HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 5. 
123. See, e.g., General Comment No. 17, supra note 49, ¶¶ 1–3; HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 
5, at 61–64; Rochelle Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where is the Paradox?, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 72, 74, 80–81 (Willem Grosheide ed., 2010); J. Janewa 
OseiTutu, Corporate “Human Rights” to Intellectual Property Protection?, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 
17–24 (2015); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 150; Peter K. Yu, 
The Anatomy of the Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 69 SMU L. REV. 37, 45–63 (2016). 
124. See, e.g., HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 64–90; Graeme W. Austin, Authors’ Human 
Rights and Copyright Policy, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 405 (2017); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human 
Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 1018–20 (2007); Peter K. Yu, 
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 
1075–1123 (2007). 
125. Shaver, supra note 111, at 123–24. 
126. General Comment No. 17, supra note 49. 
127. 2015 Shaheed Report, supra note 51; 2014 Shaheed Report, supra note 52. 
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Commissioner for Human Rights128 and the U.N. Secretary General,129 and 
resolutions by both the now-defunct Commission on Human Rights130 and Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.131 Each of these 
contributions has advanced our understanding of the intersections, tensions, and 
synergies between human rights and intellectual property. 
Nonetheless, there have also been deep critiques of efforts to use human rights 
to address imbalances in the intellectual property system. First, it is unclear whether 
human rights contributes much above and beyond what can already be 
accomplished through intellectual property law itself. Perhaps human rights law 
does mean that states should create exceptions and limitations to intellectual 
property rights,132 avoid creating international intellectual property law that unduly 
limits the ability of other states to use IP flexibilities,133 or design IP policy to achieve 
the shared values of intellectual property and human rights norms.134 These 
recommendations—as much as they would certainly be advances over current 
policy—still feel like tinkering at the edges of intellectual property. If human rights 
can be vindicated through the application of doctrines embedded in intellectual 
property law, this raises the question of what work human rights is actually doing in 
this context.135 
Second, and even more troubling, is the idea that human rights discourse, as 
it is currently deployed in the context of intellectual property policy, may even be 
reinforcing the status quo. Ruth Okediji, for example, critiques the current 
intellectual property and human rights nexus as “operat[ing] as a justification for the 
core architecture of the international IP system, with human rights considerations 
channeled through doctrines already hard-wired in contemporary IP 
jurisprudence.”136 International human rights norms around patents and copyrights 
may have ceded too much ground to rights-holders by adopting the vernacular of 
intellectual property to meet and counter their demands. 
Even the work of Farida Shaheed, the former Special Rapporteur in the field 
of cultural rights, implicitly assumes the logic and language of intellectual property. 
For example, although Shaheed’s patent report is careful not to equate the “moral 
 
128. Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 38. 
129. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 39. 
130. Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 40. The Commission was replaced by the Human 
Rights Council in 2006. G.A. Res. 60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006). 
131. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, supra note 37. 
132. 2014 Shaheed Report, supra note 52, ¶ 104. 
133. 2015 Shaheed Report, supra note 51, ¶ 89. 
134. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, supra note 37, ¶ 5 (requesting 
“[g]overnments to integrate into their national and local legislations and policies, provisions, in 
accordance with international human rights obligations and principles, that protect the social function 
of intellectual property”). 
135. Ruth L. Okediji, Does Intellectual Property Need Human Rights?, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L  
L. & POL. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3202478 [ https://perma.cc/7F2B-GZ4Z]. 
136. Id. (manuscript at 14). 
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and material” interests protected under Article 15 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) with intellectual property rights,137 
it appears to reaffirm the approach of the ICESCR Committee advocating a 
balancing approach to reconcile the two.138 As Ruth Okediji notes, the emphasis on 
“balancing” human rights and intellectual property implicitly assumes that both are 
of equal weight and “reflects an implicit assumption—or acceptance of the 
assumption—that IP rights are an optimal means to advance human development 
in a globalized world.”139 Shaheed’s report also advocates reconciling patent rights 
with the public interest by making greater use of exclusions, exceptions, and 
flexibilities.140 As Okediji notes, exceptions and limitations are unlikely to be 
sufficient to meet the needs of many developing and least-developed countries.141 
Finally, advocates also worry about the way in which the language of human 
rights is being used to advance the interests of intellectual property rights-holders. 
This co-optation of human rights is not unusual in human rights practice; as 
Goodale notes, human rights discourse has, particularly since the end of the Cold 
War, “increasingly acted as a conduit for specific—and much older—forms of 
transnational legal, economic, and political power.”142 By appropriating the language 
of fundamental rights, IP rights-owners have transformed the debate into one of 
“competing rights” and thus diverted attention from the ways in which intellectual 
property law reifies and reinforces global inequality. 
These critiques, although important and legitimate, are based on a limited 
understanding of human rights as primarily about laws and institutions. Human 
rights is not only about laws and institutions, but also about practices for mobilizing 
in the spaces these institutions enable and around the rights that the law creates. It 
is human rights in practice—human rights as the vehicle for political demands for 
justice and participation—that currently presents the most radical opportunities for 
redesigning innovation systems to promote human rights and development. Human 
rights can augment the A2K mobilization by providing a set of rhetorical, discursive, 
and political strategies for rights claiming that can be used to challenge not just the 
application of intellectual property law at the edges, but also the fundamental 
bargains that make up its essential structure. 
Critiques of human rights as failing to respond robustly to the social justice 
inequities embedded in intellectual property law and policy echo broader 
 
137. 2015 Shaheed Report, supra note 51, ¶ 10. Shaheed notes that this is particularly important 
in the context of patents, which protect economic interests. Id. ¶ 29; see also 2014 Shaheed Report, supra 
note 52, ¶¶ 28–29. 
138. 2015 Shaheed Report, supra note 51, ¶ 11. 
139. Okediji, supra note 135 (manuscript at 18). 
140. 2015 Shaheed Report, supra note 51, ¶¶ 63–72; see also 2014 Shaheed Report, supra note 52, 
¶¶ 61–73. 
141. Okediji, supra note 135 (manuscript at 22). 
142. Mark Goodale, Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and the Local, in THE 
PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 1, 30 
(Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007). 
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contemporary ambivalences about human rights. In his most recent book, for 
example, Samuel Moyn criticizes human rights for adopting a politics of sufficiency 
rather than equality—a politics that sacrifices a concern with material inequality for 
progress in addressing basic needs. According to Moyn, by focusing on “status 
equality with an ethical and actual floor of distributive protection, [human rights] 
has failed to respond to—or even allowed for recognizing—neoliberalism’s 
obliteration of the ceiling on material inequality.”143 Like the critics of human rights 
responses to intellectual property, Moyn argues that human rights is fundamentally 
a fairly thin vision of global justice. 
A significant basis of Moyn’s critique is that human rights law appears to be 
compatible with substantial material inequality.144 Here, however, Moyn is focusing 
on human rights as law, not practice. As Paul O’Connell emphasized in his 
contribution to a symposium on Moyn’s book, there are many human rights social 
movements that “routinely deploy the language of human rights alongside broader 
claims for redistribution, social transformation, decolonisation and, indeed, 
revolution.”145 Focusing on the work of large international human rights 
organizations (which tend to privilege legalistic and technocratic aspects of human 
rights) as opposed to that of local organizations (which more often deploy the 
rhetoric of human rights in furtherance of a broad variety of social goals including 
redistribution), limits our vision of human rights. Legal tools, even those aimed at 
furthering human rights and social justice, are fundamentally conservative. It is law 
in practice—the exercise of rights claiming—that contains the potential to challenge 
structural inequality. A human rights agenda for innovation therefore must focus 
not just on legal tools, but also on structuring interactions to empower those 
affected by innovation policies to demand distributive justice.146 
There are several dimensions to a reimagining of a human rights agenda for 
innovation policy. First, a human rights frame transforms an argument about justice 
into a demand for action. The human rights frame is a “social imaginary” founded 
on the “idea that all persons possess equal moral worth, that social order exists to 
realize the essential humanity of its members, and that therefore the exercise of all 
forms of authority is properly bounded by its impact on human dignity and well-
being.”147 In this way, human rights frames tell a story in which “suffering is 
 
143. MOYN, NOT ENOUGH, supra note 2, at 202. 
144. Id. at 210, 213. 
145. Paul O’Connell, Capitalism, Inequality, and Human Rights, L. & POL. ECON. ( June 4, 
2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/06/04/capitalism-inequality-and-human-rights/ [ https://perma.cc/ 
8X3A-R6VT]. 
146.  In her contribution to the symposium on Moyn’s book, Amy Kapzcynski argues that we 
need a vision of human rights in which the “‘center’ is at the ends of the network, where people are 
using human rights promiscuously as they build power locally.” Amy Kapczynski, What Comes After 
Not Enough?, L. & POL. ECON. ( June 11, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/06/11/what-comes-after-
not-enough/ [ https://perma.cc/C8RA-CHMW]. In the context of intellectual property, this would 
include promoting capacity-building among local human rights and civil society organizations to contest 
the development of intellectual property policy in ways that are meaningful to them. 
147. BRYSK, supra note 21, at 26. 
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political—caused by the abuse of power and alleviated by the rule of law.”148 For 
example, the use of a human rights frame to address the relationship between 
widening inequality and extreme poverty has the potential to transform the issue of 
inequality from a regrettable side effect of neoliberalism into a question of justice 
that can and should be—indeed must be—remedied through political and judicial 
processes.149 
Second, human rights explicitly require us to consider the distributional 
impacts of innovation policies. For example, as Lea Shaver has noted in examining 
the impact of copyright on the cost of books, traditional law and economics 
approaches to intellectual property entirely overlook the question of inequality. 
Copyright may be about promoting creation of printed materials, but “‘[m]ore 
books for whom?’ is a question that the prevailing theoretical frameworks of 
copyright scholarship never ask.”150 The question of who has access is exactly the 
kind of question that human rights can and does ask. 
Third, a human rights frame also provides a forum in which advocates can 
advance the claim that states have obligations to citizens outside their borders. One 
important but underdeveloped area of international human rights law concerns that 
question of what, if any, obligations states might have to individuals in other states. 
The ICESCR, which includes the obligation to ensure that individuals and 
communities benefit from scientific progress, does not contain a territorial 
limitation. The global nature of these obligations combined with the right to 
development provide a basis for arguing that states ought to consider the impact on 
populations in other countries in the design and implementation of their innovation, 
trade, and IP policies. 
B. Human Rights Law “From Below” 
To realize this more emancipatory vision of human rights, we must focus on 
human rights law not in the way it is articulated at the United Nations but rather in 
how it is deployed by human rights advocates and victims to advance their goals. 
Contemporary efforts to understand intellectual property in human rights terms 
tend to address only one dimension of international human rights—the dimension 
of law. Scholarship and United Nations interventions alike have emphasized the 
normative conflict between or coherence of the two regimes—how they relate to 
one another, whether they require states to make changes to policy, and if so how. 
 
148. Id. 
149. As Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, notes in his 
2015 report: 
It must be accepted that extreme inequality and respect for the equal rights of all persons 
are incompatible. Formal recognition of the fact that there are limits of some sort to the 
degrees of inequality that can be reconciled with notions of equality, dignity and 
commitments to human rights for everyone would be an important step forward. 
Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights), Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/31 (May 
27, 2015). 
150. Shaver, supra note 111, at 150. 
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The purpose of this section is to suggest that these efforts miss a second and less 
visible, but no less important, function served by human rights—the function of 
law “from below.” 
In this context, I use the term human rights law “from below” to refer to 
human rights practice in which advocates, activists, and human rights victims 
themselves use the legal norms of international human rights to make claims on 
duty bearers.151 In this vision, human rights is not “a top-down, lawyer-driven, 
professional ‘game’” but rather a profoundly political practice.152 Legalization is an 
essential element of rights practice because it is one of the mechanisms by which 
rights can be made effective in legal systems, but it also has a depoliticizing effect, 
turning what are essentially political disputes into technocratic legal issues.153  
Law “from below,” in contrast, foregrounds the inherently political dimension 
of rights claiming. Human rights can be understood “as a discourse and set of 
practices for asserting claims.”154 These discursive practices make use of human 
rights in different ways simultaneously—as a “system of law, a set of values, and a 
vision of good governance.”155 As Kenyon argues, this requires a recognition of 
human rights “as living and changing experiences rather than codified universal 
standards.”156 Such an approach recognizes that human rights is not only a legal 
system but also a set of rhetorical strategies used to make demands on the powerful. 
By itself, human rights law can be perceived as an elite discourse, a set of legal 
arguments that are deployed by lawyers and lobbyists in advancing their claims. 
However, when it is deployed not in the form of legal arguments but as a demand 
for participation and accountability, human rights becomes a powerful challenge to 
the status quo. As Merry and her collaborators note, “it is possible for less powerful 
and knowledgeable people to access human rights through coalitions with elites and 
by using human rights as an ideology of justice and a practice of claims-making 
rather than as a system of law.”157 Thus, the emancipatory potential of human rights 
may well be located less in the power of its legal arguments than in the way in which 
the claims of justice that undergird these arguments create space for the powerless, 
and in particular those affected by rights violations, to claim their rights. 
 
151. See, e.g., Jeremy Perelman & Lucie E. White, Introduction to STONES OF HOPE: HOW 
AFRICAN ACTIVISTS RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY 1, 2 (Lucie  
E. White & Jeremy Perelman eds., 2011) (introducing case studies as “theoriz[ing] human rights practices, 
as those practices are enacted by lawyers and others on the ground”). 
152. Id. at 3. 
153. Richard Wilson, Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and Transnational 
Law, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE 
LOCAL, supra note 142, at 342, 351–52. 
154. Sally Engle Merry et al., Law from Below: Women’s Human Rights and Social Movements in 
New York City, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 101, 101 (2010). 
155. Id. at 102. 
156. Kristi Heather Kenyon, Building Up vs. Trickling Down: Human Rights in Southern Africa, 
OPENGLOBALRIGHTS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.openglobalrights.org/building-up-vs-trickling-
down-human-rights-in-southern-africa/ [https://perma.cc/8TNT-MAP7]. 
157. Id. 
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This conception of human rights provides a vehicle for the vision of 
intellectual property “from below” proposed by Professor Maggie Chon. Chon used 
the term “from below” to refer to IP policies that are connected to distributive 
justice outcomes both within and between countries.158 As such, her proposal is 
about orienting the rules of intellectual property on goals of distributive justice and 
the most vulnerable. At the same time, Chon also envisions an element of rights 
claiming as essential to these outcomes. In distinguishing her vision of intellectual 
property “from below” from others who would seek to orient intellectual property 
on socially just outcomes, Chon elaborates: 
[A] key difference between an approach from below and other critiques of 
the current IP balance is its emphasis on distributive justice outcomes. The 
perspectives and actions of the least empowered among us are included in 
more than just a formal equality sense in shaping a normative legal agenda. 
Rather, an approach from below explicitly shapes IP outcomes with 
respect to knowledge goods by specific groups, in this case, users in 
developing countries, for specific goals, which could include innovation, 
access, and affordability. . . . [L]egal rights are limited in their capacity to 
affect structural change. Those legal rights will be acknowledged by the 
formal legal system only when there is “interest convergence” between the 
powerful and those actors seeking distributive justice outcomes through rights 
rhetoric.159 
Thus, Chon’s view, while organized in the language of policy, seems to implicitly 
envision a role for discursive practices around rights claiming that echo the theories 
of Merry and others. 
Drawing on this work, this Article refers to human rights “from below” as law 
that empowers individuals to make rights-based claims to participation and 
accountability. Human rights law is not just a set of legal principles that constrain 
or enable, or are to be reconciled with, intellectual property. It is also a rhetorical 
strategy for social mobilization that enables people to make claims on the power 
structures of globalization that have arranged innovation systems in ways that 
inevitably privilege the elite.160 This dimension of human rights practice could be an 
important complement to existing efforts to challenge the logic of global intellectual 
property expansionism. 
Human rights “from below” differs in its orientation from the experientialist 
governance model proposed by Gráinne de Búrca. In that model, de Búrca focuses 
on United Nations treaty bodies as the source of norms that are then implemented 
by “lower level” actors, who in turn provide feedback to the center.161 De Búrca’s 
insights are essential for a more robust understanding of the way in which local 
actors “adapt or vernacularize international standards within domestic and local 
 
158. Chon, supra note 112, at 810. 
159. Id. at 815–16 (emphasis added). 
160. See, e.g., Goodale, supra note 142, at 6–7 (distinguishing between human rights as a body of 
international law and human rights as a normative concept). 
161. Gráinne de Búrca, Human Rights Experimentalism, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 277, 282 (2017). 
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contexts.”162 Indeed, scholars have long emphasized the importance of local actors 
in mediating between the universal and the particular.163 As Merry notes, “[r]ights 
need to be presented in local cultural terms in order to be persuasive, but they must 
challenge existing relations of power in order to be effective.”164 
Nonetheless, privileging the role of the “global” and relegating the “local” to 
the margins would be overly simplistic and descriptively inaccurate.165 Human rights 
norms are often catalyzed or generated locally, an aspect of the narrative that is 
overlooked through a focus on international institutions. Further, the process of 
implementation is not merely technocratic but indeed an act of meaning making 
itself.166 De Búrca’s insight that this meaning feeds back into international processes 
is essential, but the approach advocated here seeks to widen the lens further. 
Understanding human rights as law and practice seeks to focus attention on “the 
local” in contrast to existing approaches that have emphasized legal argumentation 
over the experience of rights and of their violation.167 
C. Human Rights as Practice 
A vision of human rights as law “from below” inevitably foregrounds its 
political nature. A human rights approach works most effectively when advocates 
are able to invoke it both as a set of laws and as a political practice. In other words, 
human rights that exists simply as a set of norms, principles, or rules, has little effect 
on social practices. The human rights practice of rights claiming, in turn, depends 
on normative statements of human rights experts and authorities to provide the 
basis on which advocates and victims can make political claims for participation, 
greater accountability, and changed practices. 
For example, human rights law is most effective when it is used by advocates 
to make demands on governments.168 Efforts to obtain recognition for the rights 
of LGBTQ individuals and to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity began as a domestic social movement and later gained additional 
 
162. Id. at 280. 
163. MERRY, supra note 72, at 1. 
164. Id. at 5. 
165. Goodale, supra note 142, at 14–15; see also id. at 17 n.13 (advocating for the adoption of a 
transnational approach because “human rights discourse is most often effective—or at least 
instrumental—in social spaces that are neither international nor national.”). 
166. Id. at 18. 
167. Id. at 14. 
168. See Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Introduction and Overview, in THE PERSISTENT 
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 3, 6–7 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 
2013); Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Claire Whitlinger & Alwyn Lim, International Human Rights Law and Social 
Movements: States’ Resistance and Civil Society’s Insistence, 8 ANN. REV. LAW. & SOC. SCI. 367, 368 
(2012). Beth Simmons has explained that human rights treaties can be valuable because they can raise 
the expected payoff of social mobilization “by providing a crucial tangible resource for nascent groups 
and by increasing the size of the coalition with stakes in compliance.” BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 15 (2009). Simmons notes that 
the value of treaties for social movements will depend on the country, and that treaties may have the 
greatest impact in countries in transitional phases. Id. at 153. 
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credibility through the pronouncements of human rights courts and United Nations 
experts.169 The Yogyakarta Principles, a document that collected existing legal 
authority for understanding the obligation of non-discrimination to include sexual 
orientation and gender identity, was essential in providing political and legal actors 
with a foundation on which to take action at the United Nations, in regional 
institutions, and at the national level.170 
Rights claiming is also essential for implementation. In South Africa, for 
example, a decision by the Constitutional Court on the right of the poor to housing 
had far less impact than might have been assumed given its progressive holding 
because it was not accompanied by an advocacy campaign.171 Other decisions of 
that Court, including decisions on access to essential medicines, had greater impact 
because they were not only driven by advocacy and social mobilization, but were 
then used by those very groups to continue to press for change.172 Similarly, studies 
of treaty ratification indicate that the two factors that contribute most to a positive 
impact are “some degree of political liberalization, the presence of an active civil 
society, and regular engagement by such civil society and by governmental actors in 
the treaty monitoring processes.”173 
The example of the Special Rapporteurs is also instructive. Human rights 
groups often rely on the Special Procedures of the United Nations to articulate legal 
norms and focus attention on particular issues.174 Jo Becker, in a book on human 
rights mobilization, offers several case studies of groups working with Special 
Rapporteurs in the Philippines, Brazil, and Jordan. Her book recounts the way in 
which the work of the Special Procedures in each of these cases was done in 
conjunction with non-governmental organizations (NGOs).175 Citing a study by the 
Brookings Institution, Becker notes that the “ability of victims’ groups and local 
and international NGOs to communicate their grievances and conduct follow-up 
advocacy” was an essential element in the success of the visit.176 Becker continues: 
Special rapporteurs and NGOs can play effective, mutually reinforcing 
roles on behalf of human rights. NGOs can provide special rapporteurs 
with critical information, strategic advices regarding the priorities and 
logistics of a mission, suggest recommendations, and conduct follow-up 
 
169. PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 220–37 (2012). 
170. Michael O’Flaherty, The Yogyakarta Principles at Ten, 33 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 280, 287–
94 (2015). 
171. Zackie Achmat, Law, Politics, and Social Transformation, 32 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 237, 
240 (2004); see also Jeremy Perelman, The Way Ahead? Access-to-Justice, Public Interest Lawyering, and 
the Right to Legal Aid in South Africa: The Nkuzi Case, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 357, 387 n.143 (2005). 
172. Achmat, supra note 171; see also Lisa Forman, Justice and Justiciability: Advancing Solidarity 
and Justice Through South Africans’ Right to Health Jurisprudence, 27 MED. & L. 661, 681 (2008); Brian 
Ray, Policentrism, Political Mobilization, and the Promise of Socioeconomic Rights, 45 STAN. J. INT’L  
L. 151, 173–74 (2009). 
173. De Búrca, supra note 161, at 304. 
174. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 33. 
175. See BECKER, supra note 117, at 79. 
176. Id. at 91. 
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advocacy. Special rapporteurs, by contrast, can provide the moral authority 
of the UN, an international platform and spotlight, and access to senior 
policymakers. Together they may be able to achieve change that neither 
can achieve alone.177 
Special Rapporteurs can also contribute to efforts to promote and protect 
human rights by articulating normative principles and clarifying and expanding the 
law. The work of former Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, provides an example. Many of the Special Rapporteur’s reports 
were devoted to legal and policy analysis of different forms of violence against 
women as human rights violations.178 The legal analysis in these reports was 
effective because domestic groups adopted the definitions of violence she provided 
in her reports to work for local change.179 
Applying these insights to intellectual property, there have been tremendous 
contributions of the expert human rights bodies of the United Nations on issues of 
intellectual property and human rights. Farida Shaheed, for example, argued in her 
report on copyright that exceptions and limitations to copyright “constitute a vital 
part of the balance that copyright law must strike between the interests of rights-
holders in exclusive control and the interests of others in cultural participation.”180 
Shaheed’s report recommended that both domestic and international copyright 
policy be subjected to human rights impact assessments to ensure the creation of 
safeguards needed to protect other human rights.181 The report also recommended 
that states place no limits on the right to science and culture unless the limit 
“pursues a legitimate aim, is compatible with the nature of this right and is strictly 
necessary for the promotion of general welfare in a democratic society.”182 
Despite their importance, however, these norms have not been taken up in 
the practice of domestic human rights advocates. Certainly, these reports provoked 
controversy and were influential at the United Nations and with the owners of 
intellectual property.183 Increasingly, regional courts appear to be relying on and 
integrating human rights arguments into their discussions of intellectual property.184 
Yet neither the UN reports nor this regional case law has gained significant traction 
in domestic advocacy around the effect of intellectual property rights on issues such 
as food, education, or health. 
 
177. Id. at 93–94. 
178. See, e.g., Radhika Coomaraswamy (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women), Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1996/53 (Feb. 5, 1996). 
179. MERRY, supra note 72, at 61. 
180. 2015 Shaheed Report, supra note 51, ¶ 61. 
181. Id. ¶¶ 94, 96. 
182. Id. ¶ 98. 
183. Yu, supra note 53. 
184. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Intellectual Property Before the European 
Court of Human Rights (Ctr. for Int’l Intellectual Prop. Studies, Research Paper No. 2018-01, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3116752 [ https://perma.cc/2ZX3-ZFKW]. 
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In describing a local movement that sought to integrate human rights 
principles into municipal law, Merry and her colleagues note: “Using human rights 
law as a social movement strategy domesticated human rights ideology. As the 
human rights framework became more firmly integrated into the state political and 
legal process, it lost some of its idealism and radical vision.”185 For human rights to 
be effective, it must engage both law and politics—it must be understood as not 
only a set of legal rules but also as a body of discursive practices around rights 
claiming. This is the distinction between what Richard Wilson calls “human rights 
law” and “human rights talk,” in which “the former refers to positivized rules in 
national or international law and the latter refers to how people speak about those 
norms, or aspire to expand or interpret them in new ways.”186 
Finally, human rights as “practice” also provides a more effective frame for 
responding to the particular demands of creating a human-rights innovation policy 
in the current political environment. The use of human rights arguments to address 
the harms of intellectual property differs from other human rights violations 
because the state, by virtue of geopolitics and international trade obligations, is not 
(or does not see itself as) capable of responding to the claims made by advocates. 
Thus, the situation is not the one envisioned by many studies of human rights and 
domestic change, which focus on rights claiming by advocates, followed by tactical 
concessions that eventually mature into behaviors of compliance.187 Rather, we 
might view the geopolitical constellations around intellectual property as a situation 
of limited statehood, in which the state is unable rather than unwilling to comply 
with human rights norms and where non-state actors such as companies are often 
the greatest rights-violators.188 In such contexts, capacity building may be more 
effective than traditional techniques such as incentives, sanctions or persuasion, in 
ensuring the promotion of human rights.189 Further, in these situations, human 
rights advocacy must be addressed not only to the government but also to the non-
state actors contributing to the violations.190 
III.  THE MARRAKESH TREATY AS TRANSLATION 
The trajectory of human rights norms on IP policies indicates that the 
potential of human rights to be a vehicle for rights claims—for asserting demands 
on duty bearers to take some action or provide some essential good—requires a 
bottom-up approach that focuses on key domestic constituencies and tells a clear, 
simple story, backed up by compelling facts about the concrete harms experienced 
by those constituencies. 
 
185. Merry et al., supra note 154, at 125. 
186. Wilson, supra note 153, at 350. 
187. See, e.g., Risse & Ropp, supra note 168. 
188. Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New 
Agenda, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 63, 
64 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 2013). 
189. Id. at 83. 
190. Id. 
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A new treaty, the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works 
for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled 
(“Marrakesh Treaty” or “Treaty”) is poised to accomplish precisely these goals. The 
Treaty requires ratifying states to create exceptions and limitations to copyright to 
allow individuals with print disabilities to create and share accessible format copies 
of printed materials, including across borders. There are several features of the 
Treaty that may allow it to provide a vehicle to translate IP issues into human rights 
terms. First, the Marrakesh Treaty identifies a clear human rights violation. Second, 
it contains explicit mechanisms that will activate domestic human rights 
constituencies, intermediaries, and other constituencies and empower them to 
engage with intellectual property experts and domestic lawmaking bodies. 
A. Background to the Treaty 
The Marrakesh Treaty is a new international instrument that is intended to 
help combat the lack of accessible reading materials for the estimated 300 million 
print disabled individuals around the world.191 The Treaty employs the legal and 
policy tools of copyright law to advance human rights ends.192 It requires states to 
create mandatory exceptions to copyright to allow individuals with print disabilities 
to make accessible format copies of books and other cultural materials and share 
them across borders.193 
The current global “book famine”—the fact that only between one and seven 
percent of books are available in accessible formats to individuals with print 
disabilities194—is directly attributable to copyright laws. Technological advances 
have made it easier than ever before for individuals with print disabilities or their 
representative organizations to make accessible format copies of digitized books.195 
Copyright, however, prevents them from doing so without first obtaining a license 
from the copyright owner.196 Moreover, even when an accessible format copy exists 
in one country, it cannot be shared with individuals in another country without a 
license.197 Thus, accessible format copies of works in Spanish cannot be shared with 
other print disabled, Spanish speaking individuals in other parts of the world. 
 
191. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF AVOIDABLE 
BLINDNESS: ACTION PLAN 2006–2011, at 1, 3 (2007). 
192. LAURENCE R. HELFER, MOLLY K. LAND, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & JEROME H. REICHMAN, 
THE WORLD BLIND UNION GUIDE TO THE MARRAKESH TREATY: FACILITATING ACCESS TO 
BOOKS FOR PRINT-DISABLED INDIVIDUALS 8–11 (2017). 
193. Id. at 1. 
194. See Press Release, World Blind Union, WIPO Negotiations Treaty for Blind People ( June 
17, 2013), http://www.worldblindunion.org/English/news/Pages/June-17-Press-Release-for-WIPO-
Book-Treaty.aspx [ https://perma.cc/7QSR-YTQL]; see also Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Hidden 
Though Flourishing Justification of Intellectual Property Laws: Distributive Justice, National Versus 
International Approaches, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2017). 
195. HELFER ET AL., supra note 192, at xxi. 
196. Id. at 5–6. 
197. Id. at xxii. 
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Copyright law, which is territorial, would require new accessible format copies to 
be made for each jurisdiction.198 
Although exceptions to copyright for the benefit of the blind are among the 
most longstanding of all exceptions and have been long recognized as compatible 
with international intellectual property law, not all states had enacted such 
exceptions.199 States with relevant exceptions and limitations also defined 
beneficiaries in different ways, and these exceptions rarely allowed cross-border 
sharing.200 An international treaty provided a solution to this problem. 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Marrakesh Treaty provide key definitions of essential 
terms, including “works,” “accessible format copy,” “authorized entity,” and 
“beneficiary person.”201 Beneficiaries are broadly defined to include not only the 
blind but also individuals who are unable to access printed materials to the same 
degree as others without a disability.202 An authorized entity is an entity that 
provides services to beneficiaries “as one of its primary obligations or institutional 
obligations” and which “establishes and follows its own practices” to ensure it 
serves beneficiaries and to limit accessible works to those individuals.203 
The core provisions of the Marrakesh Treaty are Articles 4, 5, and 6. Article 4 
requires ratifying states to create a limitation or exception that allows beneficiaries 
or authorized entities to make an accessible format version of the work.204 Articles 
5, and 6 require ratifying states to allow cross-border exchange of such works—
Article 5 provides for cross-border distribution, and Article 6 for cross-border 
importation.205 Article 7 requires states to ensure that technological protection 
measures do not constitute a barrier to the rights provided for under the Treaty, and 
Article 8 obligates states to ensure the privacy of beneficiaries.206 
The Treaty acknowledges and protects preexisting rights of copyright owners. 
It makes several references to existing international intellectual property obligations, 
including by disclaiming any impact on preexisting obligations in Article 1 and 
making several references in Article 11 to the three-step test (the test established in 
international intellectual property law for evaluating permissible exceptions and 
limitations).207 Provisions in Article 4 and 5 also provide states with a roadmap for 
how to create these exceptions consistently with the three-step test.208 States are 





201. Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled arts. 2, 3, June 27, 2013, 52 I.L.M. 1312, reprinted in 
HELFER ET AL., supra note 192, at 93–108 [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty]. 
202. Id. art. 3. 
203. Id. art. 2. 
204. Id. art. 4. 
205. Id. arts. 5, 6. 
206. Id. arts. 7, 8. 
207. Id. arts. 1, 11. 
208. HELFER ET AL., supra note 192, at 43–45, 56, 70–73. 
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but they then need to ensure that their approach satisfies the three-step test.209 The 
Treaty contains two optional provisions that states can, but are not required to enact. 
Specifically, the Treaty allows states to condition the making of an accessible format 
copy on payment of compensation, and to limit the creation of accessible format copies 
to works that are not commercially available in the desired form.210 
The Marrakesh Treaty is a remarkable instrument for a variety of reasons. 
First, it is the first and only WIPO instrument creating mandatory exceptions and 
limitations to copyright.211 As such, it represents a shift in the normative approach 
to the relationship between human rights and intellectual property “from 
challenging expansive IP protection rules and clarifying their consequences for 
realizing human rights, to providing concrete proposals for ceilings or limits on IP 
protection.”212 Second, it presents the potential to reconceive of the three-step test 
and its relationship to human rights law. As my co-authors and I conclude in the 
WORLD BLIND UNION GUIDE: “E&Ls [exceptions and limitations] that are 
consistent with the TST [three-step test] are thus not merely permissible restrictions on 
copyright; they are affirmative expressions of government policy that embody socially 
desirable and salutary objectives, including the realization of a range of internationally 
protected human rights.”213 
These, however, are all issues of law and policy. One of the most revolutionary 
aspects of the Marrakesh Treaty, however, is not its legal but its political impact—
the effect that it might be able to have on human rights advocacy. The Marrakesh 
Treaty represents an opportunity to frame intellectual property as a human rights 
issue from the bottom up. 
B. The Marrakesh Treaty as a “Bottom Up” Instrument 
Most who have considered the Treaty thus far have addressed the Treaty’s 
consequences for domestic and international intellectual property norms,214 or the 
choice to pursue these changes through a binding instrument.215 The Treaty has not, 
however, been examined in light of its contributions to the process of human  
rights domestication. The Treaty clearly has the potential to make a significant 
 
209. Id. at 46. 
210. Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 201, arts. 4(4), 4(5); see also HELFER ET AL., supra note 192, at 
47–50. 
211. Helfer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 135. 
212. Id. at 134. 
213. HELFER ET AL., supra note 192, at 68–69; 2015 Shaheed Report, supra note 51, ¶ 61 
(“Copyright exceptions and limitations—defining specific uses that do not require a license from the 
copyright holder—constitute a vital part of the balance that copyright law must strike between the 
interests of rights-holders in exclusive control and the interests of others in cultural participation.”). 
214. See, e.g., HARPUR, supra note 1, at 78–82; Allan Rocha de Souza, Fundamental Rights, 
Development and Cultural Inclusion: The Marrakesh Treaty in Brazil, 8 WIPO J. 75, 78–86 (2016); Jerry 
Jie Hua, Implementation of the Marrakesh Treaty for Visually Impaired Persons into the Chinese Copyright 
Law, 1 CHINA & WTO REV. 7, 13–18 (2017); Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 194, at 29–31. 
215. See Margot E. Kaminski & Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Marrakesh Treaty for Visually 
Impaired Persons: Why a Treaty Was Preferable to Soft Law, 75 U. PITTSBURG L. REV. 255 (2014). 
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contribution to human rights protection by virtue of the increased access its 
beneficiaries will have to printed materials in countries that ratify the Treaty—
assuming that states that ratify the Treaty implement it in ways that promote its 
human rights objectives.216 In addition, however, it provides a model for increasing 
collaboration between human rights advocates and other social movements working 
to make IP policies more just. 
The Marrakesh Treaty represents a new approach to reconciling human rights 
and intellectual property because its text and structure enable the involvement of 
national human rights actors and institutions in intellectual property lawmaking. 
This is a “bottom up” approach to international lawmaking because it is aimed not 
at imposing norms from a position of hierarchical superiority, but rather creating a 
scaffolding and rhetorical frame for national actors to make rights claims and 
participate in IP decision-making. To be clear, this is not the “bottom up” of 
regulatory sovereignty in which state actors are seeking to reassert their policy 
making authority vis-à-vis international lawmaking processes.217 Rather, it is 
“bottom up” in the sense of empowering individual victims of human rights abuses 
to claim their rights. 
1. Normative Strategy 
The Marrakesh Treaty has the potential to create this scaffolding in two ways. 
First, it involves human rights actors on an issue that is easily translatable into 
human rights terms—namely, access to books for print disabled individuals. This 
has the benefit of activating a particular constituency, rather than an issue. In other 
words, it frames the issue as a question of disability rights, not IP policy. 
Focusing on the impact that copyright can have on the rights of individuals 
with disabilities also represents a more effective approach to framing IP policy as a 
human rights issue because it identifies a specific “violation” on which human 
rights organizations can then bring their advocacy techniques to bear. The 
Marrakesh Treaty, as a treaty affecting the “right to read,” implicates a range of 
fundamental human rights—including but not limited to freedom of expression, the 
right to science and culture (including the right to participate in culture), and 
minority cultural rights.218 
The Marrakesh Treaty also provides a very compelling narrative backed up by 
empirical evidence. Digital technologies enable the ready conversion of works into 
accessible formats and sharing across borders. Individuals with disabilities could 
themselves create these copies, and they and their representative organizations 
could then share them with others around the world. Copyright stands in the way 
of 300 million individuals having access to books. Thus, the Treaty may be able to 
 
216. See HELFER ET AL., supra note 192 (providing recommendations for implementation that 
promote the Treaty’s human rights objectives). 
217. Donald P. Harris, The Power of Ideas: The Declaration of Patent Protection and New Approaches 
to International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 6 UC IRVINE L. REV. 343, 345 (2016). 
218. Lea Shaver, The Right to Read, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2015). 
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activate human rights framing of copyright much in the same way that the debate 
in South Africa—where access to essential medicines was the difference between 
life and death—transformed the discussion of patents. 
2. Institutional Strategy 
The Marrakesh Treaty also embodies institutional strategies for activating 
human rights constituencies on intellectual property issues. First, the Treaty 
explicitly links the human rights and intellectual property regimes in a way that 
allows interpretations that draw on both sets of norms. Intellectual property and 
accessibility is already linked in Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which provides that parties undertake to “ensure 
that laws protecting IP rights did not constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory 
barrier to access by persons with disabilities to cultural materials.”219 As Paul Harpur 
notes, Article 30 of the CRPD shifts the paradigm of intellectual property and 
disability rights by “providing that copyright can exist up to the point at which it 
creates a conflict with the access of persons with disabilities to cultural material.”220 
The Marrakesh Treaty explicitly references the CRPD. The preamble of the Treaty 
also mentions both the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the CRPD, 
and it emphasizes the broader importance of using copyright as a tool to realize 
both the human rights of creators and authors and the rights of persons with visual 
disabilities.221 These cross-references between treaties represent a range of 
opportunities to integrate the interpretive institutions and methodologies of human 
rights with intellectual property policy making.222 
Second, the Marrakesh Treaty also activates human rights and disability rights 
constituencies to be active on issues of IP policy. It does this most simply by 
locating implementation of the Treaty in beneficiaries themselves. Under the 
Treaty, individuals with print disabilities are directly empowered to create accessible 
format copies and share with others. Authorized entities such as libraries and 
schools may also create such copies.223 Thus, the Treaty is largely self-enforcing. 
The government is not the gatekeeper, but rather individual beneficiaries can 
immediately begin making and sharing copies.224 
Further, the Treaty also provides opportunities for disability rights 
organizations to be involved in the process of intellectual property lawmaking. Such 
involvement is mandated under the CRPD, which requires states to ensure that 
 
219. G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 30 ( Jan. 24, 
2007) [hereinafter CRPD]. 
220. HARPUR, supra note 1, at 62. 
221. Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 201, at 2. 
222. HELFER ET AL., supra note 192, at 15–20. 
223. Id. at 25. 
224. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Senior Professor of Law, Duke Univ., Keynote Address at 
the University of Cambridge Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law: Using Intellectual 
Property Tools to Achieve Human Rights Ends: The Example of the Marrakesh VIP Treaty (Mar. 11, 
2017). 
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policies that affect individuals with disabilities are made in consultation with 
them.225 This consultation will need to be with a range of disability rights 
communities, since the definition of beneficiary under the Treaty is broad and 
focused on all disabilities that prevent access to printed materials on the same basis 
with others. Affording participation in IP policymaking will not be burdensome for 
states that are parties to the CRPD, since consultation mechanisms are or should 
already be in place. Involving national human rights institutions will also activate 
and involve the human rights community. 
Key to the effective implementation of the Treaty will be to ensure that 
implementation of the Treaty is not vested solely in national IP offices, but that it 
is undertaken in consultation with human rights and disability rights 
communities.226 For example, states that are parties to the CRPD might task the 
“focal points” that the Treaty calls for to conduct outreach to and coordination with 
intellectual property offices to ensure that those offices are working to implement 
the Treaty in ways that promote meaningful access to books for print-disabled 
individuals.227 As Larry Helfer observed in a keynote address, one of the unique 
features of the Treaty is the engagement it fosters among domestic agencies: 
Among human rights commissions within or alongside the government 
and copyright and IP offices, there is the possibility for a shared mandate 
or shared competence over the Treaty that would allow a kind of 
communication between different sets of stakeholders that we haven’t seen 
at this level of granularity.228 
Broad and inclusive participation in the creation of innovative policymaking is 
an essential first step toward the creation of innovation policies that are attuned to 
local human rights needs.229 Thus, the Marrakesh Treaty poses the potential for 
supporting what Melish calls a “human rights-based approach to community problem-
solving”—an approach that “seeks to pry open spaces for negotiated settlement and 
policy engagement with government actors in the practical achievement of 
community-defined goals and priorities” and which “seeks to imagine and then 
establish parallel de facto accountability systems for private actors.”230 
By explicitly connecting human rights and intellectual property law and 
creating mechanisms to involve both intellectual property experts and human rights 
communities in implementation, the Treaty presents real and concrete opportunities 
for translating intellectual property issues into human rights terms. For human 
rights organizations, the Treaty can raise awareness of the impacts of intellectual 
property and the importance of integrating this into their work, and it connects to 
areas already within their expertise. Hopefully, the relationships that the 
 
225. HELFER ET AL., supra note 192, at 19. 
226. Id. at 78–81. 
227. Id. at 79–80. 
228. Helfer, supra note 224, at 9. 
229. Melish, supra note 110, at 10. 
230. Id. at 74. 
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implementation of the Marrakesh Treaty will foster between the human rights, 
disability rights, and intellectual property communities on the local level will lay the 
groundwork for future dialogue on other issues at the nexus of human rights and 
IP policy. 
CONCLUSION 
As an example of international lawmaking, the Marrakesh Treaty is 
simultaneously encouraging and discouraging. It is encouraging because it 
represents the culmination of years of hard work by countless dedicated advocates, 
experts, and politicians who succeeded in putting in place a treaty that has the 
potential to affect millions of lives.231 
The Marrakesh Treaty is discouraging for precisely those same reasons. 
Exceptions and limitations for the blind are among the most well recognized and 
least controversial of all possible exceptions and limitations to copyright. If it takes 
this level of investment and effort to achieve agreement on these exceptions, the 
prospects for other efforts to harmonize exceptions for libraries232 or create an 
instrument encouraging medial research on neglected diseases233 do not look 
promising. Even the Marrakesh Treaty itself almost did not succeed. As Larry Helfer 
recently noted: “But there were political alignments, as well as factual and legal 
alignments, that made this multilateral instrument possible. I am not at all confident 
that those same alignments exist in other areas where claims for users’ rights and 
public interest exceptions are also quite strong.”234  
Paul Harpur is also skeptical about the ability of the Marrakesh Treaty to have 
much more than incremental impact. Although he praises it for increasing access, 
he notes that the Treaty will at best only address disparities in access between 
individuals in the United States (where only 15% of books are in accessible formats) 
and individuals elsewhere in the world.235 Harpur concludes: 
Realisation of the notion of equality as envisaged by the CRPD 
will not be achieved by these small and important steps alone, but 
by the adoption of a regime that restricts the capacity of people 
to produce barriers to equality, as opposed to a regime that 
focuses on restricting people who are trying to obtain access.236  
 
231. See, e.g., Sean Williams, Comment, Closing in on the Light at WIPO: Movement Towards a 
Copyright Treaty for Visually Impaired Persons and Intellectual Property Movements, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L  
L. 1035, 1049–72 (2012); see also HARPUR, supra note 1, at 84–90 (discussing the opposition of the 
publishing industry). 
232. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Standing Comm. on Copyright & Related Rights, 
Draft WIPO Treaty on Exceptions and Limitations for the Disabled, Educational and Research 
Institutions, Libraries and Archive Centers, SCCR/20/11 ( June 15, 2010); see generally Helfer, OXFORD 
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 136. 
233. Kapczynski et al., supra note 12, at 1064; see generally Helfer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra 
note 4, at 136. 
234. Helfer, supra note 224, at 9. 
235. HARPUR, supra note 1, at 81–82. 
236. Id. at 92. 
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Despite these reservations, however, the Marrakesh Treaty is nonetheless a 
watershed development in human rights and intellectual property law. Not only is 
it the first intellectual property treaty to pursue human rights ends, but it is also the 
first to offer a platform for resolving some of the tension between human rights 
and intellectual property through bottom-up domestic reforms. As Helfer notes, 
“[d]omestic implementation provides a crucial opportunity to challenge interstate 
bargains or revisit disputes that could not be fully resolved during multilateral 
negotiations.”237 The Treaty leaves some terms undefined and provides discretion 
to state authorities in implementing others. Intellectual property and human rights 
constituencies will need to engage with one another to find answers to these 
questions, and in the process, they may significantly extend our understanding of 
the relationship between these sets of norms.238 
Thus, the Marrakesh Treaty should be viewed as a model, not only for its 
substance, but for its structure. Human rights practitioners have historically paid 
little attention to the consequences that increasingly stringent trade rules around 
intellectual property protection have on the issues on which they work. The Treaty 
has the potential to change this by activating an organized community, telling a clear 
story about a “violation,” and creating pathways for individuals affected by 
intellectual property rules and their representative organizations to engage with IP 
policymaking on the domestic level. Creating a foundation for future involvement 
of human rights rights-holders in intellectual property lawmaking is essential to 
realizing the emancipatory potential of human rights challenging the fundamental 
bargains of the international intellectual property system. 
The impact that innovations systems have on a range of human rights—from 
education to health to freedom of expression—is extraordinary. The choice to fund 
our innovations through market-based mechanisms should be as concerning to 
human rights advocates as private prisons or private hospitals. Hopefully, the 
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